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JUDICIAL REVIEW OF MEDIATED SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS: IMPROVING MEDIATION
WITH CONSENT
Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Ask any law student who has taken a mediation or ADR course to describe
mediation and its benefits. They most likely would inform you that mediation is a
voluntary process based on party self-determination.1 Mutually satisfactory solutions are
possible, individual interests and personal needs are met, and adversarial encounters are
avoided. They might also add that studies report a high degree of party satisfaction with
the mediation process 2 and compliance with mediated agreements.3
A review of U.S mediation litigation over the past 14 years shows a less rosy
picture. Varying shades of buyer’s remorse dot the landscape as parties seek to avoid
enforcement of their mediated agreements. In looking at the claims of these parties, I am
reminded of some words from T. S. Elliot’s poem, The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock –
“That is not it at all. That is not what I meant, at all.”4 Seeking to disentangle themselves
from promises made or allegedly made in mediation, disappointed parties claim problems
in contract formation, mistake, fraud, duress, coercion and undue influence. While some
parties seem more sympathetic than others (compare the exhausted, excluded from
mediation, 65 year old Mrs. Olam5 to the sophisticated Winklevoss twins in the Facebook
litigation who were accompanied at mediation by a team of six lawyers, a valuation

*Professor of Law, Director of ADR & Conflict Resolution Program, Fordham University School of
Law. My thanks to Marc Arkin, Jim Coben, Marianna Hernandez Crespo, Jennifer Reynolds, Alison Shea
and Nancy Welsh for helpful insights and comments on this essay. Thanks also to my excellent research
assistants Megan Reinhardt and Ashley Dumoff.
1
MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS, Standard I(A) (2005) available at
http://www.mediate.com/pdf/ModelStandardsofConductforMediatorsfinal05.pdf. Standard I(A) provides
in part: “A mediator shall conduct a mediation based on the principle of party self-determination.”
2
Christopher Guthrie & James Levin, A “Party Satisfaction” Perspective on a Comprehensive
Mediation Statute, 13 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 885 (1998); see also Barbara McAdoo & Nancy Welsh,
Does ADR Really Have a Place on the Lawyer’s Philosophical Map?, 18 HAMLINE J. PUBL. L. & POL’Y
376 (1997).
3
See, e.g., Craig A. McEwen & Richard J. Maiman, Small Claims Mediation in Maine: An Empirical
Assessment, 33 ME. L. REV. 237 (1981) (compliance with mediation was higher than with adjudication);
Craig A. McEwen & Richard Maiman, Mediation in Small Claims Court: Achieving Compliance Through
Consent, 18 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 11 (1984) [hereinafter McEwen & Maiman, Achieving Compliance
Through Consent].
4
T.S. Elliot, The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock, POETS.ORG, available at
http://www.poets.org/viewmedia.php/prmMID/20220 (last visited Mar. 7, 2013).
5
Olam v. Cong. Mortg. Co., 68 F. Supp. 2d 1110 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (court-sponsored voluntary
mediation; the sixty-five year old plaintiff suffered from high blood pressure, headaches and abdominal
distress. She argued that while she was in pain, weak and dizzy, she was pressured into an agreement by
her attorney, the mediator and the defendants and their counsel. After fifteen hours of mediation, an
agreement was reached at 1:00 A.M. Despite all these circumstances, the court found that the agreement
did not result from undue influence.).
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expert and their father, a former accounting professor), 6 courts are generally not
persuaded by human sympathies and show considerable deference to mediated
agreements.7 These agreements represent settlement, and public policy favors settlement.
How should we account for the on-going level of buyer’s remorse in some
mediations? Because I am concerned in this essay with court-related mediation, I wonder
whether it is it because so much mediation now takes place in the shadow of the courts
with all its judicial trappings. Does the court environment make parties feel somewhat
coerced into participating in, or reaching an agreement in mediation? Does it make their
“contractual undertaking” to mediate seem less than voluntary, thus depriving them of
any particular moral commitment to keep their promises? Is it because parties may not
have given informed consent to participate? Or, is it that many mediators are adept at
persuading parties to move in specific directions, possibly to places where the parties did
not want to go?8 Is it because in some contexts, the practice of mediation is becoming
very much like the practice of traditional arbitration 9 or like a judicial settlement
conference?10 The hypothesis I am working with is a “yes” to all these questions.
II. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF MEDIATED AGREEMENTS
Mediation was originally proposed as an alternative to the court adjudication of
disputes. Oddly enough, adjudication of disputes about mediation is an on-going judicial
activity. Research on mediation litigation conducted by Professors James Coben and
Peter Thompson of the period 1999 through 2003 shows that the highest number of
litigated mediation cases involve challenges to enforceability of mediated agreements. 11
Their follow-up studies through 2007 also show that parties, not always pleased with
their agreements, sought to avoid enforceability. 12
Parties still continue to challenge their mediated agreements for a number of
reasons including contract defenses such as problems in contract formation, 13 fraud, 14

6

Facebook Inc. v. Pac. Nw. Software, Inc., 640 F.3d 1034 (9th Cir. 2011) (court-ordered mediation;
claim that mediated agreement resulted from fraud).
7
See Julia Rabich, Sarah Stoner & Nancy Welsh, Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards and
Mediation Agreements: Tips for Sustaining Deference, 67-APR. DISP. RESOL. J. 48 (Feb.-Apr. 2012)
(suggesting that courts are beginning to be more demanding in reviewing awards and agreements); SARAH
COLE ET AL., MEDIATION LAW, POLICY & PRACTICE 247 (2012).
8
James H. Stark & Douglas N. Frenkel, Changing Minds: The Work of Mediators and Empirical
Studies of Persuasion , at 52 (2011), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1769167 (last visited Mar. 7, 2013).
9
See Jacqueline Nolan-Haley, Mediation: The “ New Arbitration”, 17 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 61
(2012) [hereinafter Mediation: The “New Arbitration”].
10
See Joseph P. McMahon, Jr., Moving Mediation Back Towards Its Historic Roots-Suggested
Changes, 37 THE COLORADO LAW. 6, 23 (June 2008).
11
James R. Coben & Peter N. Thompson, Disputing Irony: A Systematic Look at Litigation About
Mediation, 11 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 43, 47 (2006).
12
James R. Coben & Peter N. Thompson, Mediation Litigation Trends: 1999-2007, 1 WORLD ARB. &
MEDIATION REV. 395, 403 (2007).
13
See, e.g., McDonald v. Fox, No. 13-11-00479-CV, 2012 WL 5591795 (Tex. Ct. App. Nov. 15,
2012); Nanni v. Dinno Corp., 978 A.2d 531 (Conn. App. Ct. 2009).
14
E.g., Facebook, Inc. v. Pac. Nw. Software, Inc., 640 F.3d 1034 (9th Cir. 2011).
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coercion15 and mistake.16 It is not clear from some of the reported cases whether they
arose in the context of court-connected mediation or were private undertakings.
However, given the pervasiveness of mediation in U.S. courts,17 we know that many of
these enforceability cases have resulted from court-connected programs.
A. The Road to Judicial Review
At the risk of offering a somewhat bleak narrative, I describe in this section the
road to judicial review for a party who seeks to avoid enforcement of a mediated
agreement.
As an almost regular part of the litigation process, 18 disputing parties find
themselves involved in mediation. Though the rubrics of court-connected mediation
programs vary, the end result is the same – through a number of different process design
schemes, judges nudge, refer, or deliberately order parties to go to mediation, sometimes
with an added requirement that they participate in good faith.19 When this happens, it is
not clear whether explicit fiduciary duties are imposed on any institution or person,
whether it is the judge who referred the case to mediation, the court that sponsors the
mediation program or the mediator who facilitates the process. In response to concerns
that parties might have about being forced into what is a “voluntary” process, the
standard response is to differentiate between coercion to attend mediation, which is
permissible, and coercion within the process of mediation, which is unacceptable.20
Once engaged in the mediation process, the parties work with a mediator whose
ethical responsibilities are described in the Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators 21
or in similar standards. Unless the parties have agreed otherwise, the mediator has
extensive powers. Professor Peter Thompson has colorfully described a mediator’s work
—“[t]he mediator is free, within extremely broad limitations, ‘to work her magic’ on the
participants, establish the rules of the process, and then to use these rules to trash, bash,
or hash out a settlement.”22 The mediator’s ethical responsibility for fairness is limited to

15

E.g., Eswarappa v. SHED Inc., 685 F. Supp. 2d 229 (D. Mass. 2010).
E.g., Dupont v. Dupont, No. 2006-CA-002191-MR, 2008 WL 4951777 (Ky. Ct. App. Nov. 21,
2008); Kott v. Kott, No. 03-06-00398-CV, 2008 WL 536656 (Tex. Ct. App. Feb. 29, 2008).
17
See, e.g., In Resolving Disputes, Mediation Most Favored ADR Option in District Courts, 38 THE
THIRD BRANCH 6, 6 (July 2006); see generally COLE ET. AL., supra note 7, at ch. 9.
18
Peter N. Thompson, Enforcing Rights Generated in Court-Connected Mediation-Tension Between
the Aspirations of a Private Facilitative Process and the Reality of Public Adversarial Justice, 19 OHIO ST.
J. ON DISP. RESOL. 509, 513 (2004) [hereinafter Thompson, Enforcing Rights]; Peter N. Thompson, Good
Faith Mediation in the Federal Courts, 26 OHIO STATE J. ON DISP. RESOL. 363, 366, 417 (2011)
[hereinafter Thompson, Good Faith Mediation]; COLE ET AL., supra note 7, at 434.
19
See Thompson, Good Faith Mediation, supra note 18.
20
This explanation, which was offered in the first edition of GOLDBERG ET AL.’s DISPUTE
RESOLUTION, was criticized by Professor Sally Merry in Sally Engle Merry, Disputing Without Culture,
100 HARV. L. REV. 2057 (1987) (reviewing STEPHEN B . GOLDBERG ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION (1985)).
21
MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS, Standard I(A) (2005).
22
Thompson, Enforcing Rights, supra note 18, at 514 (citing John Cooley, Mediation Magic: Its Use
and Abuse, 29 LOY. U. CHI. L. J. 1, 7 (1997)).
16
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procedural fairness.23 The question of justice or a fair outcome is bracketed in the Model
Standards.
After participating in mediation, and unhappy with either the process or their
agreement, some parties return to court seeking to avoid enforcement of the mediated
agreement. Their narratives vary—“this is not what I meant; my lawyer forced me to
agree to this; the mediator made me do it; I had a terrible headache and felt pressure to
cooperate.” Courts imagine that, in these returning cases seeking judicial review, the
parties’ agreements resulted in the first instance from a voluntary, private ordering. They
typically apply traditional contract law analysis and uphold mediated agreements. 24 In
doing so, they often refer to the public policy favoring settlement. 25
From an efficiency perspective, one could argue that the mediation process works
very well.26 If parties reach an agreement, then it is almost a sure thing that the courts
will enforce that agreement. Judicial efficiency, predictability and the public policy in
favor of settlement, all highly prized American values, are honored. So why should we
care?
B. The Crux of the Problem
The reality is that mediation, a voluntary process, operates in a thinly voluntary
regime in the United States. Parties are referred to mediation as part of a national
disputing culture that permits compulsory mediation. Since the enactment of the
Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998, 27 which empowered federal courts to
establish dispute resolution programs, party consent is not required for participation in
mediation. 28 State courts differ on the merits of compulsory mediation but in both state
and federal courts, sanctions can be imposed for parties’ failure to participate in
mediation or for their failure to participate in good faith.29
23

MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS, Standard VI(A) (2005). Standard VI(A)
provides: A mediator shall conduct a mediation in accordance with these Standards and in a manner that
promotes diligence…procedural fairness…and mutual respect among all the participants.
24
COLE ET AL., supra note 7, at 247. It should be noted that enforcement of mediated agreements is
complicated by confidentiality concerns. See Ellen E. Deason, Enforcing Mediated Settlement Agreements:
Contract Law Collides with Confidentiality, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 33 (2001).
25
Rabich et al., supra note 7.
26
Accord, COLE ET AL., supra note 7, at 247.
27
Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998, 28 U.S.C. §§ 651-658 (2006).
28
28 U.S.C. § 652(a) (2006) provides in relevant part: “…Each district court shall provide litigants in
all civil cases with at least one alternative dispute resolution process, including, but not limited to,
mediation, early neutral evaluation, …arbitration…. Any district court that elects to require the use of
alternative dispute resolution in certain cases may do so only with respect to mediation, early neutral
evaluation, and, if the parties consent, arbitration.” Early support for mandatory mediation was found in
SOC’Y OF PROF’L IN DISPUTE RESOLUTION, MANDATED PARTICIPATION AND SETTLEMENT COERCION:
DISPUTE RESOLUTION AS IT RELATES TO THE COURTS (1991) ( stating that “Mandating participation in nonbinding dispute resolution processes often is appropriate.”) .
29
It is not surprising then that there is considerable litigation over sanctions for failure to participate
in mediation and for failure to participate in good faith. See Coben & Thompson, supra note 11;
Thompson, Good Faith Mediation, supra note 18. See also Edward Sherman, Court-Mandated Alternative
Dispute Resolution: What Form of Participation Should be Required?, 46 SMU L. REV. 2079 (1993).
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The “mediation phenomena" in U.S. courts did not just happen. U.S. courts have
long been involved in promoting mediation and other ADR processes as a way of
encouraging settlement,30 often citing judicial economy and convenience as reasons for
doing so. 31 Scholars have demonstrated that caseload pressures incline judges toward
encouraging settlement.32 So it becomes apparent that courts are not just bystanders in the
“mediation phenomena,” and this is one of the reasons that their deferential standard of
review in mediation enforceability cases is so problematic.
Consider what happens with judicial review of mediated agreements under the
current regime. Aggrieved parties return to the court system that sent them to mediation
in the first place, (the same court system that promoted wide-scale use of mediation) and
they request judicial review of their mediated agreements which they believe are tainted
with some legal impediment, frequently related to the voluntariness of their consent. The
court acts as if the mediation process that resulted in the agreement was a voluntary
undertaking. So it applies traditional principles of contract law, principles that scholars
have observed apply poorly in the context of mediation.33 More often than not, the court
will show considerable deference to their mediated agreements. The parties are stuck and
that is the crux of the problem.
III. GOING FORWARD

A. Proposals for Reform Within the Current System of Mandatory Mediation
Several thoughtful scholars have recognized the problems in mandatory, courtconnected mediation programs and suggested reform measures.34 Professor Nancy Welsh
has suggested several modifications to contract law, 35 including a cooling off period that
30

See e.g., Barbara McAdoo, All Rise, the Court is in Session: What Judges Say About CourtConnected Mediation, 22 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 377 (2007) (in the view of judges “ADR offers
assistance in getting cases settled and off their dockets”). See also Sander, infra note 47.
31
COLE ET AL., supra note 7, at 435, 439.
32
John H. Langbein, The Disappearance of Civil Trial in the United States, 122 YALE L. J. 522, 560562 (2012).
33
See Thompson, Enforcing Rights, supra note 18, at 563 (explaining that the traditional contract
defenses of duress, misrepresentation, undue influence and mistake were developed within the framework
of adversarial negotiations). See also Robert P. Burns, The Enforceability of Mediated Agreements: An
Essay on Legitimation and Process Integrity, 2 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 93 (1986) (in applying contract
law principles to mediated agreements, courts should take into consideration the context of mediation);
Coben & Thompson, supra note 11.
34
See, e.g., James J. Alfini & Catherine G. McCabe, Mediating in the Shadow of the Courts: A Survey
of the Emerging Case Law, 54 ARK. L. REV. 171, 206 (2001) (issues related to the enforcement of mediated
agreements need to be decided with reference to mediation’s unique attributes); Deason, supra note 24, at
77 (arguing that a writing is important to sustain the consensual nature of mediation).
35
Nancy A. Welsh, Mandatory Predispute Consumer Arbitration, Structural Bias, and Incentivizing
Procedural Safeguards, 42 SW. U. L. REV. 187, 209-10 (2013). Borrowing from Professor Welsh’s
research in the ERISA area, if courts insist on retaining the current deferential standard of review, it may be
possible to have them consider as an additional factor, the voluntariness of the parties’ consent to
mediation. Professor Welsh has demonstrated how in the ERISA context, the Supreme Court has
acknowledged the existence of structural bias and made it a relevant and important factor to be considered
as part of deferential judicial review.
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would permit rescission immediately after mediation. 36 She and Professor Barbara
McAdoo have argued that in mandatory court mediation programs, there should be
procedures for parties to opt-out of the process. 37 Professor Peter Thompson has
suggested truth-telling and disclosure requirements in court-connected mediation, 38 and
Professor John Lande has offered dispute system design proposals that would improve
court mediation programs.39
B. The Real Problem—Compulsory Mediation
It is time to consider that mandatory mediation in the United States, sanctioned
under the ADR Act of 1998, has outlived its usefulness.40 Compulsory mediation was
once a helpful pedagogical tool to inform parties about mediation. It engaged otherwise
reluctant clients and lawyers so that they could experience the benefits of mediation. But,
we now have a pervasive mediation regime in state and federal courts. There are multiple
models of mediation practice. Law schools and business schools teach mediation on a
regular basis and there is a substantial literature to assist them. Many lawyers and clients
are now knowledgeable about mediation.41 In fact, some lawyers are so familiar with the
process that they have become skilled in mediation tricks —spinning the mediator, 42
using mediation for discovery purposes,43 lying44 and transforming mediation into a legal

36

Nancy A. Welsh, The Thinning Vision of Self-Determination in Court-Connected Mediation: The
Inevitable Price of Institutionalization, 6 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1 (2001).
37
Bobbi McAdoo & Nancy Welsh, Court-Connected General Civil ADR Programs: Aiming for
Institutionalization, Efficient Resolution, and the Experience of Justice, in ADR HANDBOOK FOR JUDGES 1,
18 (Donna Stienstra & Susan M. Yates eds., 2004).
38
Thompson, Enforcing Rights, supra note 18, at 571; Thompson, Good Faith Mediation, supra note
18, at 424 (noting the need clear procedures for opt-out).
39
See, e.g., John Lande, Using Dispute System Design Methods to Promote Good-Faith Participation
in Court-Connected Mediation Programs, 50 UCLA L. REV. 69 (2002).
40
Several scholars have expressed concern with mandatory mediation. See e.g., Nancy A. Welsh,
The Place of Court-Connected Mediation in a Democratic Justice System, 5 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL.
117, 142 (2004) (courts should end their reliance on mandatory mediation; the court’s authority to mandate
mediation should sunset within two to three years after a court-connected mediation program has been
introduced); Richard C. Reuben, Tort Reform Renews Debate Over Mandatory Mediation, 13 DISP. RESOL.
MAG. 13, 13 (2007); Carol I. Azumi & Homer C. LaRue, Prohibiting “Good Faith” Reports Under the
Uniform Mediation Act: Keeping the Adjudication Camel Out of the Mediation Tent, 2003 J. DISP. RESOL.
67 (mandatory court-connected mediation may create process dissonance); Timothy Hedeen, Coercion and
Self-Determination in Court-Connected Mediation: All Mediations Are Voluntary, But Some Are More
Voluntary Than Others, 26 JUST. SYS. J. 273 (2005); Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, Court Mediation and the
Search for Justice Through Law, 74 WASH. U. L. Q. 47 (1996).
41
Thompson, Good Faith Mediation, supra note 18, at 423.
42
See, e.g., John T. Blankenship, The Vitality of the Opening Statement in Mediation: A Jumping Off
Point to Consider, 9 APPALACHIAN J. L. 165, 178 (2010) (proposing that when parties are placed in
different rooms, it may be easier to spin the mediator).
43
Julie Macfarlane, Culture Change? A Tale of Two Cities and Mandatory Court-Connected
Mediation, 2002 J. DISP. RESOL. 241, 267 (reporting reaction of an attorney in a mandatory court mediation
program that “…mediation is a perfect opportunity for the fishing expedition…”).
44
Peter Reilly, Was Machiavelli Right? Lying in Negotiation and the Art of Defensive Self-Help, 24
OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 481 (2009); Don Peters, When Lawyers Move Their Lips: Attorney
Truthfulness in Mediation and a Modest Proposal, 2007 J. DISP. RESOL. 119 (2007).
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process that fits more with their adversarial inclinations. 45 Corporations are active
mediation users and in recent years have preferred it to arbitration.46 In short, through the
use of compulsory mediation, we have made substantial progress in educating potential
users about the value of mediation.47
My suggestion that compulsory mediation has outlived its usefulness is not to
suggest abandoning court-connected mediation programs. Rather, improving the quality
of justice in these programs should be the goal.
One way to achieve this goal is to simply abolish compulsory mediation and
require that parties give informed consent to mediate.48 The ADR Act of 1998 could be
amended to exclude mediation as one of the processes that does not require consent.49
Other options include economic incentives such as those used by some countries in the
European Union50 following issuance of the Mediation Directive.51 Another option would
be enhanced educational programs. Continued efforts by the courts to educate the public
on what to expect from the mediation process is important to assist parties in their
decision-making about mediation. Taking advantage of available technology, courts
could provide parties with informational videos portraying different approaches to
mediation.52 Then, a party’s decision to participate or not participate in mediation would
at least be based on an informed understanding of the mediation process.
The option I propose for consideration in this essay is adopting the English view
that mediation is a consensual process but that courts may use robust encouragement to
engage parties in mediation. If parties unreasonably refuse their consent to mediation,
then costs can be imposed. This represents a departure from the usual English rule that
the losing party pays costs. In this regard, it is worth noting that in England, there are far
45

See Nolan-Haley, Mediation: The “New Arbitration,” supra note 9; Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley,
Lawyers, Clients and Mediation, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1369, 1380-81 (1998).
46
Thomas J. Stipanowich & J. Ryan Lamare, Living with ADR: Evolving Perceptions and Use of
Mediation, Arbitration and Conflict Management in Fortune 1,000 Corporations, SOCIAL SCIENCE
RESEARCH NETWORK, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2221471 (reporting on the results of a survey of
corporate counsel in Fortune 1,000 companies conducted in 2011, text accompanying note 26).
47
See Frank E.A. Sander, Another View of Mandatory Mediation, 13 DISP. RESOL. MAG. 16, 16
(2007) (referring to compulsory mediation “as a kind of temporary expedient, a la affirmative action.”).
48
See Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, Informed Consent in Mediation: A Guiding Principle for Truly
Educated Decisionmaking, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 775, 776 (1999).
49
28 U.S.C. § 652(a) (2006).
50
For example, in Bulgaria, if parties are successful in resolving disputes in mediation, they are
entitled to a refund of 50% of the court filing fees and in Romania parties are entitled to 100% refund of
court fees if they settle a dispute in mediation. See EUR. PARL. DOC. (COM P7_TA(2011)0361, Par. 6)
Resolution of September 13, 2011 on the Implementation of the Directive on Mediation in the Member
States, Its Impact on Mediation and its Take-Up by the Courts, available at
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-// EP//TEXT+TA+P7-TA-20110361+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN (last visited Mar. 7, 2013). For more detailed discussion of implementation
of the EU Directive, see Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, Is Europe Headed Down the Primrose Path with
Mandatory Mediation?, 37 N. C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 981 (2012).
51
2008 O.J. (L 136/3) Parliament and Council Directive 2008/53/EC, European Mediation Directive,
available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:136:0003:0008:EN:PDF
(last visited Mar. 7, 3013).
52
For example, the Virginia Judicial System offers videos depicting the facilitative style of mediation.
See Virginia’s Judicial System,
http://www.courts.state.va.us/courtadmin/aoc/djs/programs/drs/mediation/resources/home.html (last visited
Mar.7, 2013).
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fewer cases of parties challenging the enforceability of their mediated agreements, 53
suggesting perhaps that party consent enhances compliance with mediation agreements.54
IV. MEDIATION IN ENGLAND
After an extensive study of its civil justice system, which was plagued by delay
and general malaise, 55 England reformed its Civil Procedure Rules (CPR) effective
1999.56 As a result of the reforms, courts were empowered to encourage litigants to use
appropriate ADR processes to settle their disputes and to punish those who failed to do
so.57
For several years, the English courts struggled with questions about their power to
establish a compulsory mediation regime. The cases went in differing directions with
some courts imposing costs on parties who unreasonably refused consent to mediate.58
Finally, in 2004, the Court of Appeal rejected a compulsory mediation regime in Halsey
v. Milton Keynes General NHS Trust and Steel v. Joy. 59 Party consent would now be
necessary for parties to participate in mediation. To do otherwise and require unwilling
parties to mediate, would, in the court’s view, violate a litigant’s fundamental rights to
have access to the courts and violate Article 6 of the European Convention on Human
Rights. The court observed that its role was to encourage, not compel parties to engage in
ADR. Encouragement, however, could be “robust,” and parties who unreasonably refused
to give consent to mediation could be assessed costs.60
This represented a significant departure from the traditional English rule that the
unsuccessful party pays the costs of the successful party.61 The Halsey court offered a
non-exhaustive list of six factors which could be considered in determining the
53

See Crystal Decisions (UK) Ltd. v. Vedatech Corp., [2008] EWHC (Civ) 848 (mediation agreement
challenged on the grounds of duress and fraud); Brown v. Rice & Patel & ADR Group, [2007] EWHC (Ch)
625 (issue of whether a settlement was reached during mediation).
54
Cf. McEwen & Maiman, Achieving Compliance Through Consent, supra note 3.
55
See Loukas A. Mistelis, ADR in England and Wales, 12 AM REV. INT’L ARB. 167 (2001)
(discussing England’s civil justice reform efforts in the 1990s).
56
Lord Woolf, Access to Justice-Final Report, THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES (1996) available at
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.dca.gov.uk/civil/final/contents.htm (last visited
Mar. 7, 2013). This report formed the foundation of Uniform Civil Procedure Rules for England. For a
more detailed discussion of England’s reform efforts, see Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, Mediation
Exceptionality, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1247, 1256-59 (2009) [hereinafter Mediation Exceptionality].
57
References to the term “ADR” in England, are usually understood as being a reference to some
form of mediation. Halsey v. Milton Keynes Gen. NHS Trust, [2004] EWCA (Civ) 576, [5].
58
See, e.g., Dunnett v. Railtrack PLC, [2002] EWCA (Civ) 302; Royal Bank of Can. Trust Corp. Ltd.
v. Sec’y of State for Defence, [2002] EWHC (Ch) 1841; Hurst v. Leeming, [2001] EWHC (Ch) 1051.
59
See generally [2004] EWCA (Civ) 576 (Eng.).
60
Costs generally include reasonable litigation expenses, court fees, legal fees, expert witness fees
etc. See Herbert M. Kritzer, The English Rule, 78-NOV A.B.A. J. 54 (1992). An extensive study of costs in
England conducted by Lord Rupert Jackson was published in 2009. See Rupert Jackson, Review of Civil
Litigation Costs: Final Report (Dec. 21, 2009) available at
http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/Resources/JCO/Documents/Reports/jackson-final-report-140110.pdf.
61
The CPR 44.3 provides that the unsuccessful party will be ordered to pay the costs of the successful
party. Under the American Rule, each party to the litigation bears their own costs. See Kathryn E. Spier,
Pretrial Bargaining and the Design of Fee-shifting Rules, 25 RAND J. OF ECON. 197 (Vol. 2, Summer
1994).
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reasonableness of a party’s refusal to consent: (a) nature of the dispute; (b) merits of the
case; (c) extent to which other settlement methods have been attempted; (d) whether
ADR costs would have been disproportionately high; (e) whether delay in using ADR
would have been prejudicial; and (f) whether ADR had a reasonable prospect of
success.62
Mediation litigation in England focuses more on parties who unreasonably
refused consent to mediate than on those who seek judicial review of mediated
agreements. Thus, the most active role of the courts in mediation is reviewing parties’
unreasonable refusals to consent to participate in mediation. A review of the mediation
consent cases shows that courts do not have a deferential attitude toward England’s
robust policy of encouraging mediation. They seem to have little problem in finding that
refusals to consent to mediation were not unreasonable.63
I am not suggesting that we simply import the English rule on a wholesale basis
into our mediation jurisprudence. Given the real threat of meaningful cost sanctions, it
cannot be said that mediation is a purely consensual process in England. But, the
requirement of party consent must matter in some respects considering the paucity of
cases challenging the enforceability of mediated agreements in England. Thus, the
English rule might be worth adopting as a pilot project in the United States. 64 As a
settlement tool, it has more teeth than some of the settlement mechanisms we currently
have such as Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68.65 Robust encouragement such as cost
sanctions (which would include attorney fees) could provide meaningful incentives for
parties to mediate.
What could we expect to happen under a consensual mediation regime? There are
multiple possible responses to this empirical question. We could end up trading merits
litigation for mediation litigation. More cases would be tried, more legal norms would be
established and some ADR critics might be pleased at this development.66 Another result
might be increased litigation generally, by retaining current levels of mediation litigation
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and adding to it, litigation over the reasonableness of refusing consent. Alternatively, a
consensual mediation regime might simply substitute the current enforceability and good
faith litigation with litigation about a party’s reasonableness in refusing consent to
mediate. In this case, the basis for judicial review would change but it might be a change
for the better. Focusing on the reasonableness of a person’s behavior fosters respect for
individual choice and honors self-determination, values that are close to the heart of
authentic mediation.
Based on England’s experience, a consensual mediation regime would most likely
come with a price. Court mediation programs could become under-utilized 67 and
decreased usage might result in other settings. Recently, commercial mediation practice
in England has been described in paradoxical terms. Despite the high number of
successful mediations, there is low usage.68 But, a potential reduction in mediation usage
in the U.S. should not be cause for great concern. There are several other ADR processes,
some of which are compulsory, which can be used to encourage settlement.69 Let them
do their job so mediation can return to its proper place in the courts as a voluntary
process.
V. CONCLUSION
Mediation has drifted, untethered from its original understanding70 as a voluntary
process based on party self-determination. With this drift has come some party
dissatisfaction as evidenced in continuing challenges to the enforceability of mediated
agreements. A return to voluntariness would help to anchor mediation on a foundation
based on justice principles (procedural and substantive) rather than on raw power to
compel participation.
Mediation should operate in a voluntary system that honors party selfdetermination. When courts engage in judicial review of mediated agreements and apply
traditional contract law analysis, the agreements that are reviewed should derive from a
voluntary mediation regime where parties have given informed consent to participate in
the process and to the outcome that is reached.
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